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Abstract
Clouds are here to stay, and the same holds for cyber-physical systems—not to forget their combination. In light of
these changing paradigms, it is of utter importance to reconsider security as both introduce new challenges.
Overcoming the concept of zoned networks, clouds make former internal traffic traveling the Internet. Cyber-physical
systems include physical parts into computing and make them potential targets for cyber attacks—a dare as a high
number of physical parts have originally been developed to be stand-alone. Cyber-physical cloud computing
reinforces the need for a thoughtful security concept. Firewalls are among the basic building blocks in network
security and are offered by various cloud providers; however, the question on their quality of protection arises. In this
paper, we assess firewall offers of five major cloud providers with respect to cyber-physical system integration.
Therefore, we study their default configuration, configuration capabilities, documentation, and filtering behavior. We
developed an extendible firewall monitoring tool that enables customers to probe their provider’s filtering behavior—
an information of interest for risk management or further security consideration. Re-assessing filtering behavior, we
found that all offered firewalls have evolved over a time period of more than a year: Configuration possibilities have
been enhanced, more illegitimate packets are filtered now, and stateful behavior was discovered at a certain provider.
1 Introduction
Cloud computing has become a standard technology in
the business as well as in the consumer sector. Up to 90 %
of enterprises are using the cloud in some way [1], and
almost everybody is using some sort of cloud application,
e. g., Dropbox1, Spotify2, or Google Docs3, in private live.
Cloud computing is now amulti-billion dollarmarket with
still high annual growth rates [2], and has changed the
way we see computing: It is a utility—similar to water or
electricity—now, and companies and individuals are able
to flexibly access the desired amount of workload on a
pay-per-use basis.
Almost concurrently, the trend towards cyber-physical
systems arose. Nomen est omen, such systems intercon-
nect the physical world that we live in with the by now sep-
arate world of computing and communication [3]. Based
on the motivation that physical objects should become
smarter, a number of novel concepts have been proposed,
e. g., smart grid, smart production, or smart living. These
concepts aim for more efficiency, handling of potential
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energy shortage, a higher level of sustainability, or simply
more convenience.
Obviously, it did not take long time to combine the
concepts of cloud computing and cyber-physical systems:
There was no reason for cyber-physical systems to resign
clouds’ flexibility; neither, clouds to refrain from connect-
ing with the physical world especially as the latter were
already connected to information technology’s communi-
cation infrastructures like the Internet.
Security is a major factor in cloud computing as well as
in cyber-physical systems; but both concepts suffer from
indisposition with respect to security. Cloud computing
makes former internal, potentially sensitive traffic travel
the Internet as it blurs the traditional concept of zoned
networks. Further, responsibilities are shared among the
customer and the provider requiring reciprocal coordina-
tion. Whereas, cyber-physical systems frequently include
physical systems that have originally been developed as
stand-alone systems without the vague idea of intercon-
nection. This fact might make them susceptible to even
very basic type of attacks. Transferring this traffic as-is
over the Internet to a cloud appears to be far from a secure
solution.
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Firewalls have always been a cornerstone of network
security as they filter prohibited outgoing and/or incom-
ing traffic and remain even an important appliance within
such new concepts. A number of cloud providers offer
firewalls to their customers. However, details on their
type, location within the architecture, functionality, etc.
are rare; documentation is rather unsatisfying due to its
recipe style. As a result of lacking knowledge, security
considerations are shot in the dark. Aiming to overcome
this gap, we investigate firewalls’ role and security in cloud
computing with respect to cyber-physical systems. Our
work is fourfold and represents an extended version of our
previous work [4]:
• Cyber-physical systems in clouds is a relatively new
concept. Thus, we describe it in detail and highlight
already existing as well as potential future scenarios.
By the example of these scenarios, we highlight the
importance of cloud firewalls.
• We investigate the quality of firewalls at five major
cloud providers Amazon EC2, IBM Softlayer,
Microsoft Azure, Google Compute Cloud, and
Rackspace as we believe them to be adequate
representatives of the public cloud landscape.
Therefore, we rent our own instances, investigate the
default configuration, the possibilities of
configuration, and the relevant documentation.
Furthermore, we probe firewall filtering by means of
our firewall testing tool.
• The field of cloud computing is changing rapidly.
Providers are constantly introducing new
functionality or improving current offerings, not
omitting firewalls. Thus, we develop a tool that
enables cloud customers to check their firewall on
their own. We provide this tool on an open-source
base to the public. Further, the tool is extendible with
additional test scenarios.
• We investigate the change of firewall capabilities at
the aforementioned cloud providers over time
between the year of 2014 and 2016, again by means of
our firewall testing tool. It highlights that all
providers offering firewalls further developed their
offerings. We identified enhanced configuration
possibilities as well as improved filtering. Finally, we
investigate additional aspects, i. e., TCP filtering,
fragmentation, and Path maximum transmission unit
(MTU) discovery.
Section 2 provides background on cloud computing and
major providers, firewall types, and cyber-physical sys-
tems in general. Section 3 describes the convergence of
the two concepts of cloud computing and cyber-physical
systems and is followed by Section 4 highlighting respec-
tive scenarios. As the providers typically refrain from
providing in-depth information on their infrastructure,
we develop in Section 5 an extensible tool for firewall
probing. In Section 6, we repeat our analysis from our
previous work and highlight firewall evolution over time.
Section 7 introduces new test cases and focuses on the
aspects of TCP filtering, fragmentation, and Path MTU
discovery. Section 8 discusses the results and infers prac-
tical advice for gaining secure virtual instances. The paper
is concluded in Section 10.
2 Background
In this section, we provide background information on
cloud computing, its service models, and major cloud
computing providers; cyber-physical systems and their
advantages in general as well as a typology on firewalls.
2.1 Cloud computing and service models
Cloud computing is defined as “a model for enabling
ubiquitous, convenient, on demand network access to a
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction.” by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
[5]. It encompasses the five characteristics of on-demand
self-service, broad network accesses, resource pooling, and
rapid elasticity. However, clouds appear in various ways
and are classified into three service models [5]. The ser-
vice model assigns responsibilities to customer and cloud
provider in different combinations: While with Software
as a Service (SaaS), the customer uses a provider’s appli-
cations running in the cloud by means of a web browser
or a certain client; in Platform as a Service (PaaS), a cloud
provides a platform including programming languages,
libraries, etc. to run customer-created applications. Infras-
tructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers however offer
resources to the customer where she is able to run her
applications including an operating system of choice.
Figure 1 shows a representation of a cloud system con-
sisting of four layers: infrastructure, hypervisor, operating
system, and application. As can be seen, the lower two
layers are always the provider’s responsibility, while the
upper layers differ. Since in SaaS a provider basically
offers an application for use, a customer’s responsibility
for maintenance is very limited; in PaaS, the application
layer is split into the platform, maintained by the provider,
and the developed app of the customer. As IaaS allows
the customer to choose and configure an operating sys-
tem, the responsibility of maintenance belongs with the
customer. In the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model,
virtual machines (VMs, often referred to as instances) are
paid for by usage, generally in terms of uptime hours,
GB of storage and bandwidth used. Users in the IaaS
model have control of the whole VM from the kernel layer
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Fig. 1 Responsibility assignment of customer and provider according to service model
upwards: The choice of operating system tends to be left
to the customer, although most cloud providers offer a
number of pre-specified options for easy installation. The
user may then operate the VM as though it was any other
remote server, with administration over SSH, hosting rela-
tional databases, or providing public facing web services
over the internet. Many providers allow for a number of
instances to be easily connected inside a group, simulating
a LAN in the cloud.
IaaS is the least abstracted level of cloud computing. The
next level up, PaaS, offers the customer a slightly more
removed but still comparatively customizable cloud com-
puting platform. The operating system is usually set or
the choice is much more limited than with IaaS, and the
provider offers a number of underlying applications, APIs,
or other tools in order to simplify the use of the cloud
platform. The definition of PaaS is somewhat broad, and
certain PaaS products, such as parts of Microsoft’s Azure
cloud suite, span more than one category. The final level
we see is SaaS. This involves offering a product directly
from the cloud, though this does not preclude having cer-
tain locally installed elements to add extra features or
provide a better service.
The current cloud computing marketplace is a young
market and still relatively diverse [6], but a number of
larger providers hold considerable market share. This
paper looked at a number of different cloud comput-
ing providers who all enjoy a considerable level of mar-
ket share in the cloud computing space, summarized
in Table 1. Consistent with the origins and high initial
setup costs of a cloud computing platform, they are all
large, well-recognized names in the technology sphere.
Providers are ranked in approximately decreasing size of
market share, although the way in which cloud computing
operates makes it extremely difficult to make accurate
comparisons. Companies are often under no obligation
to report the extent of their revenue which comes from
cloud computing, and the use of different metrics makes
direct comparison difficult. However, it is universally
acknowledged that Amazon is the largest player in the
cloud computing space, with as much cloud revenue and
capacity as the majority of the competition combined
[7]. Many providers offer a number of service types or
are difficult to classify. Google’s Compute Engine uses an
IaaS model much the same as Amazon’s Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2), which shares little with Google App Engine,
the company’s other offering firmly in the PaaS area. Parts
of the Azure cloud suite are also PaaS offerings, but their
virtual machines are a standard IaaS product.
2.2 Cyber-physical systems and their advantages
In recent decades, physical systems were distinct from
computing and communication networks [3]. Such phys-
ical systems were the electrical power grid delivering
power from plants to customers, cars consisting mainly
of mechanical parts, or production systems for manu-
facturing goods and many more. Although such systems
had some basic communication or computing facilities,
e. g., ripple control to switch street lights on and off, or
engine control units controlling petrol injection, they are
considered to be stand-alone. Computing and commu-
nication was a system internal. Likewise, computing and
Table 1 A comparison of cloud computing providers in the study
Provider Service type
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communication systems like telephony or later the Inter-
net were stand-alone. They were intended to work on
“immaterial” goods like information or money and had
no direct impact on the physical world. The development
in the areas of embedded systems, real-time systems, and
control however enabled the connection between phys-
ical systems and the world of computing and provide
new possibilities of monitoring, coordination, and con-
trolling. Such systems spanning among both worlds—the
physical world and the cyber world—are called cyber-
physical systems [8, 9]. Examples are modern aircrafts full
of sophisticated functionality as the autopilot, a body sen-
sor network sensing your vital data for medical purposes,
the smart grid being the next-generation power grid, mod-
ern factories heavily relying on information technology,
modern communicating transportation systems, or fully
automated and connected buildings [3, 8]. Cyber-physical
systems are multidisciplinary approaches and thus involve
a variety of different fields, e. g., mechanical engineer-
ing, electrical engineering, medicine and bio-medical
engineering, civil engineering, computer science, and
telecommunication.
Actual linking between the physical and the cyber
world is done by means of sensors and actuators as
depicted in Fig. 2. Sensors measure physical quanti-
ties and convert them into an electrical signal; this
signal is sampled and quantized to make it ready for
computing. Calculation is done based on these values
before being returned to the physical world by means of
actuators that convert electrical signals into a physical
action [10].
Advantages of cyber-physical systems are manifold. In
the following, we name a few: Physical resources can be
accessed remotely from all over the world—similar as
communication over the Internet has overcome physical
presence of communicators. The combination of physical
systems with computing allows to tackle problems of our
era, e. g., the exit from nuclear and fossil-fuel energy. Pro-
cessing immense masses of data allows more efficiency or
more convenience.
In the context of cyber-physical systems, also the term
Internet-of-Things is frequently used. The Internet-of-
Things “is the pervasive presence around us of a variety of
things or objects—such as [...] sensors, actuators, mobile
phones, etc.—which, through unique addressing schemes,
are able to interact with each other and cooperate with
their neighbors to reach common goals” [11]. As cyber-
physical system, Internet-of-Things is an umbrella term
for a development that is a convergence of a number
of already existing technologies. For the purpose of this
paper, we use cyber-physical systems meaning both as the
concepts are similar and intersect in large parts.
2.3 Typology of firewalls
Firewalls are among the older but still highly important
tools in security and continue to play an important role
both in home networks and in enterprises [12]. Firewalls
are components residing at the border of two networks
and inspect traffic going from one to the other. Modern
firewalls are powerful, fully featured security tools capable
of matching incoming traffic against complex rules to pro-
tect the vast array of modern networks against numerous
threats and malicious actors. For best security results, no
traffic should bypass the device to guarantee inspection of
the whole communication process. Reflecting the historic
development of these security tools, firewalls are grouped
into three types [13].
The most simple are packet filters. They hold a number
of rules which define allowed or disallowed traffic; while
the first is forwarded to the other network, the latter is
dropped. Rules include source and destination address as
well as ports identifying the service. The decision is based
solely on the currently inspected packet, and no connec-
tion context is maintained. The advantages of this general
approach allow the firewall to handle a high level of ser-
vice without any in-depth knowledge; this also allows the
integration of newly developed services the firewall is not
already aware of. Beyond, the simple architecture has only
a limited need for resources in comparison to other types.
On the other hand, they do not have full insight into the
Fig. 2 Cyber-physical systems connect both worlds by means of sensors and actuators
Ullrich et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security  (2016) 2016:18 Page 5 of 20
communication as a number of protocols are stateful, i. e.,
packets may be in general valid, but not at this certain
point in communication.
Stateful filters go beyond this approach and maintain
a context for connections. This allows the use of previ-
ously seen packets as part of the decision regarding the
current packet [14]. This way, it is possible to guaran-
tee that certain packet types are protocol-compatible, not
only considering the message format, but also considering
their point within the communication process, although at
the cost of requiring more memory. Typically, real-world
stateful filters also use simple packet filtering for the best
effect.
The third step in firewall evolution are application layer
filterswhich have special code for every application.While
this allows even deeper inspections and is thus also con-
sidered to be more secure, the drawback is the specialized
code for every application. This generally leads to the sit-
uations that only the best known services are available,
without any extension for niche or novel protocols, and
application layer filters are more costly in terms of com-
puting. Currently, deep packet inspection is all the rage,
which also scans the packets’ payloads, e. g., for malware.
For all kinds of firewalls, the permissive and the restric-
tive approach can be applied. Describing the default
behavior, a permissive firewalls allows all traffic to pass
unless specified otherwise; restrictive configurations drop
everything unless specified. Assuming in general every-
thing as evil, the latter is far more common. The majority
of firewalls are able to log events and raise alerts if certain
conditions are met.
The fact that an IaaS provider cannot know ahead of
time what the client intends to use their machines for
means that traditional firewalls are unsuitable, as shown
in the comparison of Figs. 3 and 4. In a traditional net-
work, data ingress/egress is restricted and protected by a
firewall customized to the specific setup. A cloud network
deals with different challenges. The firewalls, provided
by the provider, must be capable of protecting individ-
ual groups of instances without advance knowledge of the
expected traffic. This is not a problem faced by SaaS or (to
a slightly more limited extent) by PaaS providers. In SaaS,
the provider knows exactly the needs and requirements of
the application and can tailor the security set up accord-
ingly. The situation for PaaS is slightlymore complex given
that the provider does not have complete knowledge of
the use of the platform, but still knows what mechanisms
are supplied for the client to use. As a result, the most
interesting case is IaaS, as here the firewall providers must
adapt the most to the changes brought by the cloud envi-
ronment; flexibility may be one of cloud computing’s most
heralded advantages, but it may also present problems
when we consider the security of the cloud environment.
After all, securing any border without knowing in advance
Fig. 3 Simplified diagram of a traditional network: data ingress/egress
is restricted and protected by a firewall customized to the specific
setup
what is to be expected is considerably harder than when
one has exact knowledge, as in SaaS, of what should be
allowed in or out.
3 Cyber-physical cloud computing
At the moment, we experience two new computing
paradigms. On the one hand, there is cloud computing.
Its major improvement is the provision of immense com-
puting resources for an acceptable price and with high
flexibility as well as scalability; but clouds are restricted to
the virtual world of computing. On the other hand, there
are cyber-physical systems that allow to access the phys-
ical world from the cyber world. Their drawback how-
ever might be their more limited amount of computing
resources. Thus, it was not a long time before these two
paradigms were merged—especially seeing the fact that
Fig. 4 A cloud network deals with different challenges. The firewalls,
provided by the provider, must be capable of protecting individual
groups of instances without advance knowledge of the expected
traffic
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both cloud computing as well as cyber-physical systems
were capable of interconnection.
Being already a subject of NIST, cyber-physical cloud
computing is defined as “a system environment that can
rapidly build, modify, and provision cyber-physical sys-
tems composed of a set of cloud computing based sensor,
processing, control, and data services” [10]. Their benefits
are explained as the following [10]:
• Cyber-physical clouds lead to more efficient resource
use as it overcomes the rigid structures of today’s
systems that are specialized for a certain purpose.
Various of these specialized systems own their
equipment for the same goal, e. g., measuring a
certain quantity every now and then or influencing a
certain parameter once in a while. With
cyber-physical clouds, components like sensors can
be reused for various purposes and are thus not
underutilized anymore.
• (Physical) functionality is offered as a service to
customers, and this modularity allows to create new
systems or modify existing systems within a short
time and reasonable amount of work.
• Like advanced programmable interfaces (API) for
configuration in clouds [5], there will be a framework
allowing easy (self-)configuration making it simple to
create oneself a cyber-physical cloud.
• Devices are aware of the context that they are in, e. g.,
whether they are measuring in a residential home, a
supermarket, or a production facility. Due to this
additional environmental information, gained data
appears more valuable for processing and might be
more fertile for exploitation in autonomous systems.
• The provision of easily accessible and configurable
resources allows to adapt the system to prevent or
recover from a failure—an advantage for availability
and resilience.
Combinations of cyber-physical systems and cloud
computing are already available. By now, however, not all
benefits are available as realization is in its early stages.
Nevertheless, we are able to see the potential of such an
approach.
4 Scenarios combining cyber-physical systems
and the cloud
Cyber-physical systems connect the physical world with
the world of computing and are rather diverse in their
appearance. Their physical part might not only be as small
as a single sensor but also assume large proportions like a
whole factory or power grid. Likewise, the share and role
of (cloud) computing varies from rather simple data rep-
resentation to complex planning of efficient production.
This section provides a selected blend of such scenarios
that appear to be representative for cyber-physical cloud
computing. Some of these scenarios are already daily busi-
ness, some are just brought to the market, and others are
still visionary and will take some time to become real-
ity. At the end, we draw a conclusion on these scenarios
and highlight their need for security in general and for
firewalls in particular.
4.1 Ubiquitous fitness and healthcare
Smart phones are carried with their owner (almost) every-
where, and their sensors enable ubiquitous measurement
of the world that we are living. This data gives valuables
clues about our daily behavior and subsequently to our
personal constitution. Exploited for the good, your mobile
is able to become your personal fitness trainer as realized
for example in the runtastic4 app. Tracking your jogging
exercises, it decides whether you meet your fitness goals
or whether you improve. This data is not only then trans-
ferred to a public or private cloud [15] as it provides more
computing capabilities for data analysis than the smart
phone but also allows to compare with other users for the
sake of competition and motivation.
While smart phones are strictly speaking computing
and no “physical” devices in the sense of this paper’s
definition of cyber-physical systems, this is not yet cyber-
physical cloud computing. However, sensing with your
smart watch, a wristband as sold by Jawbone5 or neck-
lace, e. g., Bellabeat Leaf 6, makes it cyber-physical. Such
devices further allow accurate measurement of vital
parameters like pulse or respiration rate and skin tempera-
ture. Such permanent measurements might help asthmat-
ics to be alerted before a shock or trigger emergency calls
in case of abnormalities. Beyond, implantable chips might
give you urgent drugs in the future [16].
4.2 Interactive architecture
People have to tell a house their needs, e. g., by pressing
the switch in case of desire for light. Conveniently, the
house would infer its residents desires automatically with-
out such direct interactions. Interactive architecture aims
for that, i. e., an “exchange of information with the user, in
such a way that the interactive system adjusts its assump-
tions about the user’s needs and desires.” [17] and thus
requires a discreet way of monitoring people. Wearables
as smart watches, wristbands, or necklaces could be used
therefore and allow the house to open the door for you or
dim the light. Likewise, the cloud appears appropriate due
to its computing power and flexibility [17].
4.3 Vehicle updating
By now, cars have been stand-alone physical systems;
modifications—even those in software—have required
visiting the garage. Appearing inadequate for our mod-
ern, fast-living world, car manufacturers now envision
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automatic updates similar to those in smart phones.
Software updates and new features should be deliv-
ered over the Internet—independently of a car’s loca-
tion and without any connection to dedicated tools of
themanufacturer—creating a cyber-physical system.Tesla
has been the first manufacturer using over-the-air updates
[18] with others like BMW, Ford, or Volvo to follow. As the
computing demands for delivering the updates are hard to
forecast, cloud flexibility and scalability appear to be suit-
able. The manufacturer Ford uses the public Azure cloud,
while Volvo’s platform is hosted in an Ericsson cloud [19].
4.4 Cloud-based manufacturing
Clouds enhanced computing; now, they continue with
manufacturing making factories future-proof. Xu [20] dis-
tinguishes two types of how cloud computing is used in
manufacturing. Smart manufacturing describes the direct
use of cloud computing services in manufacturing and
are typically centered around their business processing,
i. e., replacing their traditional IT infrastructure. Bring-
ing Enterprise Resource Planning, Customer Relationship
Management, Human Resource Management, etc., to the
cloud supports better collaboration between different
sites, wholesalers and retailers, or between customers and
producers due to better integration and easier access [20].
Beyond, this way of using the cloud in manufacturing
appears to be most promising from today’s point of view
[21]. A practical example is salesforce7. Whereas, cloud
manufacturing describes the move towards service ori-
entation. Distributed physical resources are virtualized
and encapsulated before being provided as a service on
a central platform to customers [20]—similar to virtual-
ization of computing resources in cloud computing. As
a result, manufacturing inherits many of a cloud’s inher-
ent characteristics like multi-tenancy, resource pooling,
pay-per-use, or self-service [22]. In contrast to smartman-
ufacturing that is becoming state-of-the-art in industry at
the moment, cloud manufacturing raises still a number
of research questions. Anyway, production systems are
highly likely to include certain aspects of cloud comput-
ing.
4.5 Virtual vehicles
Virtual vehicles are a concept for information acquisi-
tion, i. e., gathering information for search, tracking, or
even surveillance purposes. Instead of sending a vehicle
for every single operation, the cloud concept is reused
and a number of virtual vehicles share a single physical
vehicle and all its sensors [23]. The authors present this
concept by the example of a quadrotor helicopter. This
concept is similar to cloud computing and manufacturing
insofar as physical resources are shared; but in addition,
objects are moving in space. Being a potential concept of
the future, there are a number of open research questions.
For example, virtualization would not only have to sched-
ule computing resources but also to decide the trajectory
of moving.
All these scenarios require heavy networking: Vital data
or data about your residental behavior crosses the Internet
a couple of time, i. e., rather private data is available in the
generally accessible Internet. Car updates that potentially
change a car’s behavior transit the Internet as well; like-
wise, data possibly changing or interrupting a production
plant and also virtual vehicles are controlled via a network.
In conclusion, the following holds for all scenarios:
1. Data is traveling from a source to a sink over the
Internet.
2. This data is rather sensitive with regard to privacy or
security.
Thus, network protection is of utter importance. Fire-
walls are the most basic building block therefore, and
their role and guaranteed level of protection has to be
understood in detail.
5 Firewall testing tool
In this section, we present our firewall test tools. First,
architectural aspects are considered; then, we describe our
implementation.
5.1 Architectural consideration
Although firewalls are offered by cloud providers, none
of them allows deep insights into the architecture. The
available documentation as indicated later in Table 2 is
typically of limited use due to beingmore like a handbook.
From a customer’s perspective, the following is known:
(1) We are able to configure ports and addresses, mostly
from a web interface for a group or a single instance. (2)
Every customer is able to make a configuration for her
own needs. However, the providers refrain from stating
whether the customer can configure partially a perime-
ter firewall this way or a hypervisor-based firewall. While
Amazon’s approach of security groups lets one think of
a more de-centralized approach like the second alter-
native, Microsoft Azure naming of end points lets one
rather believe in a configurable perimeter. In the case of a
hypervisor-based solution, we are further not able to infer
whether the firewall is placed in front of the hypervisor or
afterwards directly before the guest operating system; see
for both alternatives Fig. 5.
While this seemsminor at first sight, the order may have
serious impact: Hypervisors are not obliged to deliver
packets onto the guests without any alteration. For exam-
ple, they can decide to reassemble fragments before for-
warding due to performance issues. One has to be aware
that the connection between hypervisor and guest is














Table 2 Default settings of firewalls from major cloud service providers
Provider Firewall Web Documentation Inbound/outbound Configuration Default inbound config Default outbound config
available interface available separated parameters
Amazon EC2 ✓8 ✓ ✓ ✓ Transport layer protocol9 ,
port (single or range),




Google Compute Engine ✓11 ✓ ✓ ✗12 Transport layer protocol,
port (single or range),
source (anywhere, single IP or range)
ICMP,
SSH (TCP, 22) from anywhere,
RDP (TCP, 3389) from anywhere,




Microsoft Azure (Classic) ✓13 ✓ ✓ ✗14 Transport layer protocol,
port (single),
source (range)
SSH (TCP, 22) from anywhere * to anywhere
(not configurable)
Microsoft Azure (Res. Mgr.) ✓15 ✓ ✓ ✓ Priority (of a rule),
transport layer protocol,
port (single or range),
source and destination (anywhere or range),
action (allow or deny)
SSH (TCP, 22) from anywhere * to anywhere
Rackspace ✗
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Fig. 5 Alternatives for hypervisor-based firewalls
MTU. Thus, in the first case, the packets investigated
by the firewall are how they traveled on the network,
while they might have been altered by the hypervisor
in the second alternative. This has impacts on the way
firewall rules have to be defined as well as the complex-
ity of the firewall mechanism itself, e. g., a hypervisor
reassembling the fragments releases the firewall from
doing so.
As a consequence of these uncertainties, we have cho-
sen to establish a black box model including the firewall
independent of its location in combinationwith the hyper-
visor functionality, see Fig. 6. We are able to access the
prober as well as the virtual instance for measurements
and therefore define the following general test approach:
1. Start of the capturing tool on the receiver, i. e., the
virtual instance
2. Establishment of pre-conditions, e. g., TCP
handshake
3. Sending of test packet(s) from the prober to the
virtual instance
4. and observe whether packet(s) has/have been
captured by the sniffing tool
We preferred this over invoking a response from the vir-
tual instance as this would add more chances for failure.
By means of this set-up and specific test scenarios, we aim
to answer the following question:
5.1.1 Which aspects (e.g., protocols and respective fields)
are filtered?
This issue encompasses the ISO/OSI layer the firewall
is inspecting and which protocol header field is there-
fore included. Conceivably, we will heavily work with the
network layer protocol IP and transport layer’s TCP and
UDP. This also include layer-dependent mechanisms, e. g.,
fragmentation.
5.1.2 Do cloud firewalls reveal stateful or stateless
behavior?
Knowledge on firewall behavior enables customers to esti-
mate the extent of protection and the residual measures
to gain the required level of protection, e. g., by additional
host firewalls. As today’s state-of-the-art are stateful fire-
walls, it would be unusual to find plain packet filters.
Thus, we will investigate the “extent of statefulness” of the
tested implementations.
5.1.3 Are application layer filters implemented?
Application layer filters would imply a large interven-
tion into a customer’s traffic and might restrict their free
choice of ports. On the other hand, it would provide more
control on what is going into the cloud. We limit our
research however on application layer filters for HTTP as
we believe that this would be the first choice beneath SSH
and FTP for providers for implementations, due to the
vast number of web servers in the cloud.
Fig. 6 Assumption for black box firewall testing in cloud environments
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5.2 Implementation
As a precondition, we presume that at least one port is
reachable by the testing client, which is used later as a
feedback and communication channel between the test
client and the server. Our approach consists of two com-
ponents: a testing client that executes test cases against
a cloud instance and a server component running on
the cloud instance and recording the traffic during test
execution. A test case implements a concrete scenario
outlined in Section 6.2. As a test oracle, the test case
can evaluate the network traffic that reached the server
instance in order to decide if the test case was blocked
by the cloud firewall. In best case, the test case hides
a randomized token, e.g., by adding it to the payload,
within the test connections and seeks afterwards in the
traffic dump for this token. If the token is present, the
test case fails because the request has passed the cloud
firewall.
Figure 7 gives a detailed view of the communication
between the test client and the server component run-
ning on the cloud instance. In detail, the client connects
to the server component running on a cloud instance
using a plain TCP connection. This channel is used for
coordination and callbacks. A single test case is stored
as a separate file in a directory. The client loads a
test case from this directory and creates a test case
instance. Afterwards, the client tells the server compo-
nent over the communication channel to start record-
ing the network traffic using tcpdump. Subsequently,
the client executes the test case and requests the tcp-
dump of this session from the server component. The
test case instance now evaluates the success of this test
iteration using the dump received from the server. The
client repeats this steps until all test cases are exe-
cuted. We released the implementation including all test
cases16.
6 Results: firewall evolution over time
This work extends our previous work on cloud firewalls;
see [4]. Public cloud providers constantly improve their
offer and might also alter firewall capabilities in this pro-
cesses. Thus, we reran our experiments in this section, and
compare today’s results (2016) with past ones from the
year of 2014. Thereby, we identify various modifications.
In particular, Section 6.1 focuses cloud-based firewalls’
default configuration, Section 6.2 explains the utilized test
cases for probing using our firewall testing tool, and finally
Section 6.3 analyzes the results.
6.1 Default setup at major providers
In this step, we investigate the availability of firewalls
and their scope of functionality. Out of the providers
in Table 1, Rackspace and IBM (Softlayer) could not
be tested as they do not offer a firewall, the subject
of this paper. We looked at Amazon’s Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (EC2), Microsoft’s Azure Cloud Platform,
and Google’s Compute Engine. It has to be noted
though that Azure offers now two deployment models—
Azure Classic and Azure Resource Manager—having
impact on our topic. New virtual instances should be
launched into the more recent Resource Manager mode,
while the old instances remain in Classic mode if not
migrated.
The latter—EC2, Azure, and Compute Engine—provide
firewalls to protect instances, groups of instances or vir-
tual instances. However, only Compute Engine names
them firewall, EC2 goes for security groups, and Azure
Classic for endpoints. Azure Resource Manager addition-
ally provides network security groups. Thus, we included
them separately into our considerations. All of them
are now configurable via the web interface that also
allows to instantiate instances; but vastness of the inter-
face makes finding configuration sometimes difficult.
Fig. 7 Communications between the test client and the server component
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Adequate documentation is provided, mostly in recipe
style and by means of practical examples.
By default, all offer good security by vastly blocking
inbound traffic, preventing unsecured instances being
exposed to the Internet unintentionally. Nevertheless,
there are subtle differences in the inbound configura-
tion as cloud instances have to be remotely accessed
anyway: Amazon EC2 and Microsoft Azure solely opens
port 22 for SSH in case of Linux instances; alternatively,
port 3389 for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) in case
of Windows instances. Google Compute Engine opens
both ports independently of the respective instances. In
all cases, rules can be added to allow certain transport
layer protocols, ports, and protocols. Although it varies
whether single values or (IP/port) ranges are allowed.
Amazon as well as Azure’s network security groups pro-
vide separate configurations on inbound and outbound
traffic, while others provide inbound configuration only
and in general all kind of outbound traffic is allowed to
pass. Amazon provided only inbound configuration in the
older EC2-classic configuration as well, so it might also
be included in the future at the other providers. Although
outbound traffic is configurable, the default configuration
of Amazon and Azure Resource Manager allows any kind
of outgoing traffic. Beyond, Amazon is the only provider
giving the advice to restrict SSH connections to your own
IP address when instantiating a new instance and provides
therefore a mechanism for automatic detection.
Azure now not only provides endpoints as a means of
protection but also network security groups that contain
rules for the protection of a virtual network. While they
were only controllable in a programmatic way at the end
of 2015, they are now also accessible via the web interface.
By default, none network security group is present, and
protection is thus solely provided by endpoints. An overall
overview can be seen in Table 2.
This paper concentrates on vendor provided software
firewalls. Some providers, such as IBM Softlayer, offer the
option of a dedicated hardware firewall, which is beyond
the scope of this paper and has more in common with
traditional enterprise networks than the cloud environ-
ment. Similarly, we are not looking at local, instance, or
OS level firewalls, an area covered by traditional firewall
products such as iptables and other commercial offer-
ings. We are primarily interested in the new challenges
that the cloud brings to security and how vendor pro-
vided perimeter firewalls can work towards mitigating
these threats.
Finally, let us conclude the changes since our first mea-
surements in 2014 [4]:
• Amazon EC2 provides functionality to automatically
determine one’s own IP address—a valuable support
for firewall configuration for less experienced users.
Amazon’s intention is to restrict SSH/RDP access for
remote maintenance.
• Google Compute Engine’s firewall is now also
configurable by means of the web interface.
Previously, it was necessary to use Google Cloud SDK
via the terminal. This change makes control easier for
users without or limited command line experience.
• In its new deployment model, Microsoft Azure,
provides network security groups in addition to
endpoints. They allow separate inbound/outbound
configuration. While they had to be configured by
means of the Azure command line in the past, they
are now accessible via the web interface.
6.2 Test cases
For our test tool, see Section 5. We implement test cases
according to Table 3. With these test cases, we determine
the responses of firewalls to specific inputs, in order to
classify them and to examine how they would respond to
certain well known security threats. The test cases are sep-
arated in groups A to E depending on the functionality.
Some test scenarios, e. g., 1 or 7, are benign scenarios to
test for functionality and connection. For a detailed expla-
nation, we refer to the test cases provided with our testing
tool.
We chose to examine the firewalls’ responses in the
following areas:
A: Internet protocol (IP) Test cases 1 to 6 cover basic
aspects of IP and a variety of illegitimate field com-
binations. These scenarios test the extent of packet
investigation on the network layer. At present, we limit
the test cases to IPv4 as IPv6 is at the moment not
widely supported in public clouds. By now, IBM Soft-
layer and Rackspace—both not offering firewalls—are the
only providers supporting IPv6 natively at their virtual
instances.
B: Fragmentation The firewalls’ responses to frag-
mented packets, both normally generated and “malicious”
overlapping packet fragments, weremeasured in test cases
7 to 11. The same operating system was used for all
tests, and kernel level measuring tools were employed to
ensure the firewall, not the OS, was responsible for the
observed behavior. We used both, fragmented ICMP and
UDP packets, except for Azure where only UDP was used,
as Azure does not permit ICMP traffic at all.
C: Basic TCP and UDP Group C scenarios (test cases 12
to 17) cover basics aspects of the transport-layer protocols
TCP and UDP, i. e., invalid source and destination ports as
well as invalid checksums.
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Table 3 Implemented test cases
ID Name
A IP
1 Valid ICMP Request
2 Checksum invalid
3 Invalid packet length
4 Invalid header length
5 Reserved flag unequal zero




9 Overlapping fragmentation without terminating fragment
10 Overlapping fragmentation in reverse order
11 Tiny fragments
C Transport layer protocols
12 Invalid source port (TCP)
13 Invalid source port (UDP)
14 Invalid destination port (TCP)
15 Invalid destination port (UDP)
16 Invalid checksum (TCP)
17 Invalid checksum (UDP)
D TCP flags
18 Null packet (no flags)
19 SYN, FIN
20 SYN, FIN, PSH
21 SYN, FIN, RST
22 SYN, FIN, RST, PSH
23 FIN
E Stateful behavior
24 SYN in established connection
25 ACK without ACK number
F Application layer
26 Improper HTTP request
D: TCP flagging Group D (test cases 18 to 23) con-
tains a number of packets with TCP flag combinations,
tested without a previously established connection. From
these results, we infer whether there are checks on absurd
combinations in absence of an established connection.
E: Stateful behavior Stateful behavior, i. e., in combina-
tion with an established connection, is tested with test
cases of group E (test cases 24 and 25). In general, all state-
less test cases should be repeated within a connection. In
our first measurements, see [4], we saw at a very early
stage that stateless behavior is prevalent, and thus limited
the number of developed test cases.
F: Application layer The last group F targets the applica-
tion layers firewalls. We targeted HTTP as it seems to be
one of the most heavily used protocols in clouds.
These areas have been well addressed by traditional fire-
wall products.The absence of any form of firewall logging
means that the testing took on a black box approach, with
limited information available even with full access to the
firewall configuration menus.
6.3 Firewall responses over time
We ran the test cases twice, once at the end of 2014
and now (mid 2016); results of both runs are presented
in Table 4. Therefore, we used the firewalls’ default con-
figurations with slight adaptions: First, we allowed TCP
traffic for our testing tool’s synchronization, and second,
we opened another port, both for TCP and UDP traffic,
for probing.We chose port 100 (or alternatively port 3333)
for the first, and port 6666 for the latter. Where possible,
we allowed ICMP traffic to pass. In the following para-
graphs, we describe our results and especially highlight
differences to our results of [4], as they indicate further
development of cloud firewalls.
A: Internet Protocol (IP) Firewalls filter all these pack-
ets as expected, however, with a single exception. Azure
generally disallows ICMP (see test case 1) without any
possibility to opt-in. The other providers allow ICMP
traffic; Google by default and Amazon offers respective
configuration possibilities. The results of these test cases
imply that packet investigation on the network layer is not
only present but also successfully filters malformed pack-
ets. We did not find any differences between our results
from 2014 and now. All these test cases were originally
written using ICMP; however, Azure’s policy forced us
to rewrite them (as well as those for fragmentation, see
next paragraph) for UDP as a transport layer protocol; we
provide both to our readers.
B: Fragmentation While benign fragments (test cases 7)
passed the firewall at all providers in 2014, they do not
pass in Google and Azure at the moment; unfortunately,
we could not identify the exact reasons from the network
traces but consider scapy’s fragmentation functionality
as root. Overlapping fragmentation are mostly filtered;
however, the responses differ with overlapping fragments














Table 4 Results of test cases per cloud provider (✓ filtered, ✗ unfiltered)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Amazon Q4/14 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Q3/16 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Google Q4/14 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Q3/16 ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Azure Classic Q4/14 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Q3/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Azure Res. Mgr. Q3/16 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
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lets them pass, Google and Azure filters them. Their
actions are consistent when the fragments are received in
reverse order (test case 10). Looking at the packet cap-
tures from the receiver, we saw that fragmented packets
are reassembled before reaching the virtual instance, i. e.,
by the firewall or the hypervisor. We believe that this is
done for performance reasons. Changes are prevalent for
tiny fragments, i. e., packets that are reassembled from a
single fragments: They are now filtered at all providers.
C: Basic TCP and UDP Test cases 12 to 17 indicate
checks of transport layer protocol fields. Invalid source
ports, i. e., zero, are allowed to pass at all providers; invalid
destination ports are filtered. The latter behavior appears
obvious when following a port-based filter approach as
there is no rule for this port. While invalid checksums
were allowed to pass at our first measurements; Google
seems to check them now. While transport layer checks
were absent in 2014; at least Google seems willing to
introduce such checks now.
D: TCP flagging Test cases 18 to 22 test absurd flag com-
binations, provider reactions differ. While Amazon and
Google let them pass, Azure Classic filters all expect the
null packet (test case 18). All providers let FIN packets
(test case 23) pass albeit there is no established connec-
tion; such FINs appear however meaningless without the
latter. In conclusion, Amazon and Google do not appear
to check flags at all, Azure to a certain extent. Beyond,
we did not identify any changes in comparison to our first
measurements.
E: Stateful behavior All firewalls allow sending SYN
flags in an established connection as well as packets
containing the ACK flag without an acknowledgement
number, i. e., there are no changes in comparison to our
previous measurement. In addition, it appears as there is
no stateful behavior at any of the providers.
F: Application layer In our previous measurements, no
signs of an application layer firewall were found. Now,
it seems that all check for invalid HTTP requests. This
might be an indicator that application layer firewalls
have been implemented meanwhile. However, we saw that
Amazon still accepts the header when sent within an
established TCP connection; thus, the results might also
be caused by some sort of statefulness.
Additional findings Each platform disallows the use of
certain protocols: Google’s Compute Engine does not
allow SMTP (port 25) or SMTP over SSL (465 and 587);
Azure does not permit ICMP packets to be sent or
received. In a similar way, EC2 also blocks sending of
SMTP mail by default, though this can be enabled by sub-
mitting a support request and using a set of Amazon APIs
(SES). None of the services responded to either crafted
UDP packets or to a UDP scan using the Nmap port scan-
ning tool. The result were the same no matter if the ports
were opened or closed in the firewall. We see from this
that the firewall does not send an ICMP “Port Unreach-
able” notification when the port is closed. This is expected
for Azure, which completely disallows the use of ICMP,
but perhaps less so for Amazon EC2 and Google Compute
Engine.
7 Results: an in-depth look on responses
On the one hand, comparison of firewall functionality
over time has shown certain improvements; on the other
hand, certain functionality has remained unchanged over
the last years. Thus, we decided to extend our work
and investigate the following issues in more details. First,
we focus on overlapping fragmentation. While the fire-
walls appear to work well at the very first glimpse, there
might be more subtle differences and shortcomings, see
Section 7.1. Then, we investigate TCP flag-based filter-
ing in more detail, see Section 7.2. Finally, we take a look
on unknown TCP options and Path MTU Discovery; see
Section 7.3.
7.1 Fragmentation
According to the results of our first measurements, see
Section 6.3, overlapping fragmentation appears to be fil-
tered and thus securely handled. In consequence, we aim
to take a more detailed look answering the following ques-
tions: Are all fragments filtered? Are fragments already
assembled when reaching the virtual instance, and how
are they assembled? Therefore, we implemented 22 addi-
tional test cases according to the ones proposed in [24];
however, translated to IPv4.
In principle, every test case consists of three fragments:
• The first fragment consists of 24 bytes; thereof, the
first eight bytes form the ICMP header, or
alternatively UDP if ICMP is prohibited. The
remainder is a fixed string. Its More Fragments (MF)
flag is set as there are further fragments underway.
• The third packet has a fragmentation offset of 24, i. e.,
it is non-overlapping with the first fragment, and
could form a legitimate packet with the first fragment.
Its MF flag is never set as it is the last fragment.
• The second fragment is sent in between and overlaps
with the first and/or the third fragment. Its
fragmentation offset as well as its length varies and so
does its MF flag. Every test case is first executed with
the second fragment’s flag unset and then with the
flag being set.
Ullrich et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security  (2016) 2016:18 Page 15 of 20
The test cases as well as the results are shown in Fig. 8.
Every block represents 8 bytes; H an ICMP orUDP header,
the remainder letters indicate payload. The columns show
the captured packets at Amazon, Google, and Azure Clas-
sic instances.
Google and Azure Classic instances show the same
behavior: It appears that they drop fragments when
detecting overlapping ones; an exception is solely those
with their own header having a fragmentation offset of
zero. In addition, fragments following such overlapping
Fig. 8 Fragmentation handling at Amazon EC2, Google Compute Cloud, and Microsoft Azure
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fragments are also filtered; the results never show a part
of the third fragment. There is further no difference
between test cases with a set/unset MF flag. Amazon
instances show different behaviors. First, there are two
test cases where all fragments are filtered (test cases
6 and 7, each with MF is set). Second, the first frag-
ments appear to be preferred over later ones; these with
an unset MF flags are preferred over those with a set
flag.
With respect to fragmentation, Azure Resource Man-
ager shows different characteristics than its classic coun-
terpart (not present in the figure). First, it is the only
virtual instance where we see (not assembled) fragments
in our network captures, i. e., neither the hypervisor nor
the firewall seem to reassemble them and deliver them as
is to the instance. Second, it always delivers the first and
the second fragment; the third is delivered in all use cases
except 1 to 8, each with MF unset. In consequence, we
assume that all fragments before the first with MF is zero
are allowed to pass.
7.2 TCP filtering
Our previous results imply the absence of TCP flag-based
filtering at Amazon and Google; only Azure seemed to
check to a certain extent. Nonetheless, we aim to expand
our knowledge on the exact details of filtering and cre-
ated 128 additional test cases. In a first step, we probe
all flag combinations, i. e., 64 test cases as a consequence
of six flags, without a previously established TCP con-
nection. In the ideal case, only packets with a set SYN
flags should be allowed to pass in order to establish such
a connection. In a second step, we repeat these tests,
but establish the connection before by means of a TCP
handshake.
The results are shown in Table 5. As predicted, Amazon
and Google do not appear to check the flags at all.
However, Azure shows not only filtering in the absence
of a connection but also stateful filtering behavior—
contradicting our forecasts based on our first measure-
ments. In the first case, it filters all except the following
four flag combinations (1) S, (2) PS, (3) US, and (4) UPS.
This can be seen as a secure configuration. In the latter
case, it filters 24 combinations while letting the remain-
der 40 pass. These filtered cases are combinations of
SYN and FIN and/or SYN and RST. These are frequently
used for port scanning attempts and are thus of utter
importance to be filtered. Some remaining combinations
do not make sense in a TCP connection, e. g., the combi-
nation of FIN and RST; however, they appear less threat-
ening in comparison to the combinations mentioned
above. The provider might thus have chosen to let them
pass.
In consequence, we summarize our findings with
respect to TCP flags:
• Amazon and Google neither check TCP flags in case
of an established TCP connection, nor in the absence
of such a connection. This means that each and every
TCP flag combination is allowed to pass the firewall.
• Azure shows a more sophisticated behavior in both
of its deployment models. Without an established
connection, it filters all flag combination except S, PS,
US, and UPS.
• In comparison to the results of Section 6.3, we could
further discover stateful behavior at Azure. From all
(64) flag combination, only 40 are allowed to pass.
The filtered appear to prevent various kinds of port
scanning.
7.3 Further findings
In the following paragraphs, we discuss three addi-
tional findings considering (1) unknown TCP options,
(2) Path MTU discovery, and (3) ICMP Echo Requests.
First, we aim to send a TCP header with an unknown
TCP option. The test case included the option type
111 (which is undefined) and 10 bytes of payload. Our
results show that these option could pass at all tested
providers.
Second, Path MTU discovery searches for the maxi-
mum transmission unit that is able to pass a network
and is known for causing “black holes” [25] in case of
misbehaving firewalls. If the transmitted bytes exceed a
network’s MTU, a router en-route fragments the latter.
However, packets with the DF (don’t fragment) bit set are
not allowed to be fragmented en-route, and thus an ICMP
destination unreachable (ICMP code 4)/fragmentation
needed (ICMP type = 4) is returned. If a firewall now
filters exactly these ICMP message, it breaks Path MTU
discovery and creates a black hole for packets. In conse-
quence, firewalls that allow outgoing IP packets with a set
DF bit must also allow this certain kind of ICMP mes-
sage as a response. We performed manual checks leading
to the following results: Amazon allows outgoing pack-
ets with DF is one as well as incoming ICMP destination
unreachable messages; Google filters all kind of ICMP
messages with type is three (but letting others pass!), and
both deployment models of Azure appear to block all kind
of ICMP messages, see also Section 6).
During this checks, we found another issue of interest.
While Azure Resource Managers prohibits Echo Requests
from the virtual instance to other targets; Azure Clas-
sics seems to let them pass as well as their replies. This
implies that there are some statefulness insofar as echo
replies to outgoing requests are allowed to pass. In conse-
quence, we re-tried our checks at Amazon Classic for Path
MTU discovery answering to a previously outgoing UDP
packets, however, still without success. In consequence,
only Amazon shows behavior that is accordant with RFC
2979 [25].
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Table 5 TCP filtering behavior with and without an established
TCP connection
Amazon and Google Azure (both)
Connection est. No Yes No Yes
(null) ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
F ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
S ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
SF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
R ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
RF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
RS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
RSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
P ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
PF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
PS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
PSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
PR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
PRF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
PRS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
PRSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
A ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
AF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
AS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
ASF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
AR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
ARF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
ARS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
ARSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
AP ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
APF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
APS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
APSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
APR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
APRF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
APRS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
APRSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
U ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
US ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
USF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
URF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
URS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
URSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UP ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UPF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
Table 5 TCP filtering behavior with and without an established
TCP connection (Continued)
UPS ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
UPSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UPR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UPRF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UPRS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UPRSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UA ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UAF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UAS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UASF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UAR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UARF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UARS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UARSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UAP ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UAPF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UAPS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UAPSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UAPR ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UAPRF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✗
UAPRS ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
UAPRSF ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
8 Discussion
The cloud providers Amazon Elastic Cloud Compute,
Google Compute Engine, and Microsoft Azure have
implemented firewalls for protection of their customers’
virtual instances. Currently, Azure provides two alterna-
tive deployment models Classic and Resource Manager;
the latter not only provides endpoints but also (more
accurately configurable) network security groups. Current
measurements show that quality has increased since our
previous measurements at the end of 2014; improvements
are found with regard to filtering quality and/or usability
of firewall configuration. Differences are especially visible
with respect to ICMP filtering, fragmentation, and TCP
filtering.
With regard to filtering, Azure Classic as well as Google
have changed their fragmentation rules; and tiny frag-
ments are now filtered at all providers. Further, HTTP
requests without a previously established TCP connec-
tion are not feasible anymore. Beyond, Google now checks
TCP and UDP checksums and filters packets with invalid
ones. At the first glance, the more recent Azure Resource
Manager seems to behave the same way as its older coun-
terpart Azure Classic; however, fragmentation appears to
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be handled differently as our more detailedmeasurements
show.
Considering usability, Google Compute Engine caught
up and its firewall is now also configurable via the web
interface. Previously, the firewall was solely configurable
by means of command line instruction and made configu-
ration difficult for less experienced users.We saw a similar
change with Azure’s network security groups; at the end
of 2015, they were just configurable in a programmatic
way. Now, they are also easily configurable via Azure web
interface.
In comparison to our previous work, see [4], we
extended ourmeasurements with respect to three aspects.
First, we investigated TCP filtering—both in the absence
and presence of an established TCP connection. The
results are discouraging as solely Azure provides adequate
filtering behavior. In the absence of a connection, just SYN
packets (and three of its variants) are allowed to pass. In
the other case, it filters all combination of SYN and RST as
well as SYN and FIN as they do not make sense in a legit-
imate connection but are heavily used in port scanning
approaches. Amazon and Google neither show some sort
of stateful behavior, nor any attempts of filtering absurd
flag combinations. We assume that cloud providers delib-
erately allow a wide range of packets since they do not
know in advance what rented instances are used for and
thus refrain from the implementation of stateful behav-
ior. Despite being though from a security perspective,
cloud providers might prioritize easy handling over bet-
ter security. As a consequence, we advise customers to
additionally configure further means of protection, e. g., a
host-based firewall. This firewall could not only perform
statefully but also include application layer firewalls and
deep packet inspection; however, there is the drawback of
additional resources use at the customer’s expense.
Fragmentation handling shows a more pleasing pic-
ture; but again, strategies vary among different providers.
Overlapping fragments are filtered at Google and Azure
Classic (and these providers might be more vulnerable to
denial-of-service attacks in case an attacker spoofs over-
lapping fragments); Amazon aims to make meaningful
packets from the received packets (and thus might be
more vulnerable to fragments overwriting each other).
With Amazon, Google, and Azure Classic, it seems that
some intermediary, i. e., the firewall or the hypervisor,
is reassembling before forwarding traffic to the virtual
instance as we could not identify any fragments in our
network captures. Our measurements at Azure Resource
Manager show distinct (not reassembled) fragments and
lets us conclude that there is no reassembling intermedi-
ary. The latter means that final reassembly is dependent
on the operating system. Path MTU discovery appears to
be broken at all providers except Amazon and appears to
be a consequence of ICMP blocking. It appears that this
protocol is still considered harmful, especially as Azure
aims to block it (almost) totally.
In accordance with our previous work, we still believe
that logging is one of the larger features missing in today’s
firewall implementations. As we have not observed any
modification in more than a year, we draw the conclu-
sion that a logging feature is not right at the top of the
providers’ list of priorities. Nevertheless, we claim that
logging would be an significant improvement not only for
overall security but also for work’s quality.
9 Related work
This work is an extended version of our previous work
[4]. Related work beyond can be divided into three major
areas.
9.1 Firewalls
Firewalls have been used since the early days of the Inter-
net and are well understood. A number of research papers
cover aspects of firewalls in traditional network of the
pre-cloud era. The scope encompasses a wide variety of
topics like firewall design, e. g., [14, 26, 27], or quantitative
studies on configuration errors [28, 29] to name a
few. Additionally, Request for Comments (RFCs) provide
guidelines kept in a more practical way; see for example
[25, 30].
9.2 General cloud computing security
Most previous work on cloud computing security has
focused on the engineering challenges and the busi-
ness benefits of the cloud [31]. Of the studies which
explicitly consider the security implications of the cloud,
many papers consider an overview of challenges in
cloud security [32, 33], look more at the regulatory
and liability issues surrounding moving data into the
cloud [31, 34], or focus on theoretical implementa-
tions of security infrastructure [35]. Work such as
[35] has looked at how firewalls may be adapted for
cloud environments, but did not examine any current
implementations.
9.3 Cloud identification
There are numerous papers investigating cloud behav-
ior in the wild. While considering the cloud as a black
box, they aim to reveal internals on functionality and
frequently deal with security issues. Bugiel et al. [36]
investigate the security of the Amazon Image ecosystem.
Bates et al. [37–40] investigated the impact of resource
sharing among multiple virtual instances, especially tar-
geting a shared network interface card (NIC). Bowers et al.
[41, 42] consider file duplication for fault-tolerance and
local distribution of file storing in clouds. Mulazzani et al.
[43] revealed internal behavior of the popular cloud stor-
age solution Dropbox.
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However, none of them has looked at the firewall imple-
mentations of major cloud providers and examines the
current state of the art as we did. As far as our research
has shown, this is one of the first papers examining the
current, in the wild performance of cloud firewalls.
10 Conclusions
The paper at hand examines firewall implementation in
public clouds focusing on the major providers Amazon
Elastic Cloud Compute, Google Compute Engine, and
both deployment models of Microsoft Azure (Classic and
Resource Manager). We reran our measurements from
our previous work and identify changes in filtering not
only behavior but also with respect to usability. Beyond,
we extended our measurements and took a more detailed
look on TCP filtering, fragmentation, and Path MTU dis-
covery. TCP filtering is solely present at a single provider,
Azure even shows stateful behavior, while the remainder
do not filter absurd flag combination at all. Fragmenta-
tion is handled by filtering overlapping fragments (Google
and Azure) or reassembling “most meaningful” packets
(Amazon). Finally, it seems that an intermediary, i. e.,
the firewall or the hypervisor, is already reassembling
the packets before forwarding them to the final virtual
instance in most cases. We conclude that the offered fire-
walls provide a solid base of protection for cyber-physical
systems and advise customers to configure firewalls
according to their needs when running cloud instances
and additionally deploy host-based firewalls. We believe
that there is still room for further gains: cloud providers










9Availability of pre-configured rules for popular proto-
cols, i. e., DNS, SMTP, HTTP, etc.
10Amazon suggests to change the address to your own
IP after instance launching. A mechanism for detecting
this IP is provided.
11Firewalls are assigned to networks, and not instances.
12Configuration of inbound only.
13Called endpoints.
14Configuration of inbound only.
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